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ABSTRACT 
Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" contains 
difficult and often ambiguous concepts . This thesis attempts to 
clarify Heidegger's thoughts on works of art. The discussion begins 
with an examination of what Heidegger means by truth. The 
determination is that a thin .g's meaning in relation to our existence 
and what that meaning reveals about us constitutes Heideggerian 
truth. The disclosure of truth requires an encounter which allows 
things to direct us as to what they are . The possibility of our being 
directed is dependent upon the establishing of certain conditions. 
Equipment , science , technology, and language are investigated to 
determine whether or not they are able to establish the conditions 
which are necessary for the disclosure of truth. The conclusion is 
that they are not because they fall victim to our directives when we 
encounter them . Works of art are those things which are able to 
establish the necessary conditions for a proper encounter with 
things. Since things other than works of art are subject to our 
directives, artworks have become the only things which are able to 
disclose truth. This claim finds support through analysis of 
Heidegger's works "The Origin of the Work of Art", "The Essence of 
Truth" , and "The Question Concerning Technology" and through a 
critical examination of commentaries on those works. 
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PREFACE 
This text attempts to prove that Heidegger understands works 
of art as being the only things which are able to disclose truth. Since 
Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" is often ambiguous , 
his essays "On the Essence of Truth" and "The Question Concerning 
Technology" are explored to help clarify his thought on works of art. 
I attempt to explain Heideggerian truth in terms of existence , 
living. The discussion of truth then moves to an explanation of how 
it is attainable during our encounters with things. Heidegger's 
understanding of truth is not grounded in the leading interpretations 
of truth which determine truth through observation , sensation, or 
utility . Since Heideggerian truth requires that we be directed by the 
object , it becomes necessary to establish the conditions under which 
such an encounter becomes possible. 
Before claiming that works of art are the only things which 
provide for a proper encounter with things, an encounter in which 
we are directed by the thing, it was necessary to explain why things 
other than works of art do not provide a proper encounter . 
Equipment, science, technology , and language are evaluated m terms 
of the conditions necessary for the disclosure of truth . The result of 
the examination is that each falls victim to our directives of will 
during our common encounters with them. 
Works of art, however , remove us from our common encounter 
with things. Thus removed , we are free to be directed by things . 
Works of art thereby become the only things which disclose truth. 
IV 
The discussion of the artwork includes an explanation of how works 
are able to achieve the conditions necessary for the disclosure of 
truth. Throughout my discussion , I have attempted to dissolve some 
of the ambiguity of Heidegger's thought. I hope that I have been 
successful in my attempts. 
V 
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INTRODUCTION 
Traditional attempts at defining art consider only what we 
understand as works of fine art. The standards by which works of 
art have been evaluated include , but are not limited to, the accuracy 
with which the work represents its subject, the work 's ability to 
display beauty through color combinations and line configurations , 
and the artist's originality of expression. In "The Origin of the Work 
of Art" 1 Heidegger breaks with the tradition: his essay redefines art 
in terms of truth. For Heidegger, works of art are those things that 
reveal truth; in fact, artworks are the only things that are able to 
bring forth truth. In order to understand Heidegger's thought on art , 
"The Origin of the Work of Art" should be read in conjunction with 
his essays "On the Essence of Truth" 2 and "The Question Concerning 
Technology" .3 Read as a trilogy , the essays clarify Heidegger's 
understanding of truth and why this understanding is disclosed only 
m works of art. 
For Heidegger , truth is dependent upon our expenencmg it. 
Experiencing truth requires that we move out of our everyday way 
Martin Heidegger , "The Origin of the Work of Art ," in Martin Heidegger 
Basic Writing s, ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row , 
Publishers , 1977) pp. 149-187. All future references to this essay will be cited 
within the text. 
2 Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth ," in Martin Heidegger Basic 
Writings, ed . by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row , Publishers , 
1977) pp . 117-141. All future references to this essay will be cited within the 
text. 
3 Martin Heidegger , "The 
Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. 
Publishers, 1977) pp . 287-317. 
within the text . 
Question Concerning Technology ," in Martin 
by David Farrell Krell (New York : Harper & Row , 
All future references to this essay will be cited 
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of v1ewmg things and into an open region of relatedness with them. 
In this open relatedness we become directed by the thing instead of 
forcing our directives upon it. In order to receive the thing's 
directives, we must engage the object with a receptive and 
responsive state of mind and move into its truth. Since the 
encounter requires that we respond to the directives given, truth 
becomes a co-respondence between things and ourselves. Our 
response is actually a co-respondence because it is grounded in the 
relatedness between ourselves and the thing. Thus, truth depends 
on our letting the thing be the thing that it is, i.e. , viewing the thing 
as something independent from us yet related to us. Part of what a 
thing is includes how it exists or functions in relation to us. 
Therefore, the truth that we experience is not just a truth of the 
thing, but it is also a truth of ourselves . 
Things , equipment, and technology disable us from meeting the 
conditions necessary for experiencing truth. Our approach toward 
each of these is preconditioned and predetermined by their utility 
for us. Consequently, we are unable to enter into an open 
relatedness with them where we might be directed by them. 
Instead, things, equipment, and technology surrender to our 
directives of controlling and utilizing. In such cases, we provide the 
directives. The event of truth, therefore, cannot happen with things, 
equipment, or technology. 
Heidegger associates truth with language. For Heidegger , 
language is able to reveal truth when it reflects its origin. Language, 
however, has fallen victim to the technicity and utility which lay 
claim to things, equipment, and technology; we utilize language to 
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make clear our directives. Consequently , language is only able to 
reveal truth when it is poetic, thereby making it an artwork. Thus , 
the artwork becomes the only thing in which truth happens. 
Heidegger sees works of art as those created things which are 
successful m bringing forth the event of truth through their 
createdness. Such created things achieve this by removing us from 
our everyday way of viewing things. Thus removed, we are able to 
be directed by things. The artwork opens a region of open 
relatedness, enabling us to meet the conditions necessary for the 
happening of truth. 
Heidegger's redefining of art calls for a re-evaluation of the 
works which we have come to view as works of art. Heidegger does 
not understand artworks as being restricted to the fine arts. In fact, 
he may argue that some of the works which fall under this category 
are not really works of art at all because they do not bring about the 
event of truth. The theory's unwillingness to categorize artworks 
neatly clouds discussion and evaluation of the theory itself. 
For this reason, we need to explain Heidegger's views of truth 
and to establish the conditions under which truth becomes accessible. 
Our purpose is not to evaluate Heidegger's notion of truth but to 
understand it so that we may determine what a true Heideggerian 
artwork is. Next , we must examine why things other than works of 
art , specifically equipment and technology, fail to meet the conditions 
necessary for the event of truth. Finally, it is important that we 
come to an understanding of how artworks are able to disclose truth 
in order to distinguish them as works of art. Only after this 
3 
accomplishment can we understand why artworks are the only 
means of disclosing truth. 
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I. TRUTH 
At the closure of "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger explains 
that "the course of the questioning [of truth] is intrinsically the way 
of a thinking which , instead of furnishing representations and 
concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its 
relatedness to Being."(Truth, 141) Truth therefore requires that we 
transform our everyday relationship with things. Heidegger views 
our common approach toward things as being insistent and 
aggressive whereby we force our directives upon the things that we 
encounter. Truth, by contrast, calls for a contemplative and 
responsive encounter wherein we let the thing direct us as to what it 
1s. Truth is experienced; it is our entering into a relatedness with the 
thing we are encountering. The participation of the thing and of the 
discoverer m this relatedness leads Heidegger to describe truth as an 
event. 
Truth depends upon our entering into agreement with the 
thing . Heidegger explains the possibility of our bringing ourselves 
into accordance with the thing in the following passage: 
What is stated by the presentative statement 1s said of the 
presented thing in just such manner as that thing, as presented, 
is. The "such as" has to do with the presenting and its 
presented. Disregarding all "psychological" preconceptions as 
well as those of any "theory of consciousness ," to present 
here means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As 
thus placed , what stands opposed must traverse an open field 
of opposedness [Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its 
stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding [ein 
Standiges]. This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of 
opposedness takes place within an open region, the openness of 
which is not first created by the presenting but rather is only 
5 
entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness. The 
relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the 
accomplishment of that bearing [Verhaltnis] which originally 
and always comes to prevail as a comportment [Verhalten]. 
(Truth, 123 & 124) 
It is not clear what is happening when the thing stands opposed as 
object, traverses an open field of opposedness, and shows itself as 
something withstanding. For Heidegger, everything is present or 
exists within an open region. Therefore, we and the thing are 
present in the open region. It is only in an open region that we are 
able to encounter and engage with things. The open region is that 
place where the object is able to stand as an independent thing, and 
we are able to recognize it as such and consider our relationship with 
it. It is a clearing in that we are removed from our everyday 
perspective of the object; thus, the open region establishes the 
possibility for the object to stand opposed as object. 
To let the thing stand opposed as object is to acknowledge it as 
something which exists independent of ourselves. In order to do 
this, we must resist forcing ourselves upon the thing. This means 
refraining from prejudgements, a preconditioned examination, ideas 
of utility, and any other self-imposing disposition. The thing is then 
able to traverse the open field of opposedness. This traversing is 
twofold. It includes the thing projecting itself as object; yet, the 
Heideggerian notion of truth involves relatedness or co-respondence 
between us and the thing. The thing's traversing also entails a 
frustrating of the field of opposedness. That is, the thing must stand 
as an object which is independent of ourselves yet related to us. 
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These conditions establish the possibility of truth by 
establishing the possibility of openness. Openness occurs when we 
participate in and respond to the relatedness. Such involvement 
requires that we reflect upon what is presented. Truth requires that 
we respond according to the particular perspective which guides the 
thing. Perspective cannot refer to our point of viewing the thing, for 
that would be the perspective which guides us. So, our physical 
positioning in relation to the thing is not the perspective to which 
Heidegger is referring. Objects are unable to have a point of view, at 
least, not in the sense that we understand it. The particular 
perspective of the thing must refer to its relationship to us, but this 
relationship is not constituted by its physical positioning during our 
encounter with it, for physical positioning cannot guide the thing. 
Thus, we must look for what guides the thing as it exists. 
The physical properties of a thing seem secondary to making 
something the thing that it is. If we take Heidegger's example of a 
coin (Truth, 122 & 123), we can say that it is round and made of 
metal. This description, however, can also be depictive of a metal 
charm or a metal paper weight. So, what makes a coin a coin has to 
be more than just its physical attributes. We must look toward that 
which makes the coin distinct from the charm or the paper weight. 
The distinction lies in what it means to be a coin; the coin has a 
meamng which is distinct from that of the charm or the paper 
weight. Thus, the coin's meaning is the perspective that guides it to 
be the thing that it is, a coin. However, the coin's meaning is 
dependent upon its relationship to us; therefore, what a thing 1s 
encompasses what it means to us. The truth of the coin is thereby 
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not just a truth of the com but also a truth of humanity. 
Encountering the coin in openness is experiencing it physically and 
thinking about what it means to us and what that meaning says 
about us. Such encountering is only possible if we refrain from 
approaching the coin as an object of utility. Approaching the coin for 
its use value forces our directives upon it thereby disabling it from 
directing us. 
The open reg10n 1s then that place where we discover the 
thing's meaning in the context of historical humankind. Truth 
resides in the experience of relatedness; the statement reflects the 
co-respondence which occurs between ourselves and the thing. 
However, what things are is that which is presenced in the open 
region , the discoverer and the thing. What a thing is includes how it 
relates to us and how we relate to it. Therefore , the truth discovered 
1s a truth of the thing and also a truth of ourselves. The possibility of 
this open relatedness depends upon what Heidegger calls freedom 
and attunement. 
Heidegger explains freedom's connection with truth m the 
following passage: 
Freedom, understood as letting beings be, is the fulfillment and 
consumation of the essence of truth in the sense of the 
disclosure of beings. "Truth" is not a feature of correct 
propositions which are asserted of an "object" by a human 
"subject" and then "are valid" somewhere, in what sphere we 
know not; rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an 
openness essentially unfolds [west]. All human comportment 
and bearing are exposed in its open region. Therefore man is 
in the manner of ek-sistence. (Truth, 129) 
Truth now becomes the revelation of what it means to exist. 
Freedom is being able to look onto the interplay between things and 
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ourselves. In the open reg10n , comportment involves the thing and 
ourselves. Freedom lets the thing be the thing that it is by 
empowering it to direct us, but the thing only exists as the thing that 
it is in relation to us. That is, the disclosure that we encounter when 
we freely engage a thing in the openness of the open region 1s a 
disclosure of the thing and of our own existence. However, the 
disclosure depends upon the thing being free to stand opposed as the 
thing that it is and our being free to receive it as the thing that it is. 
If we freely engage the thing, we experience it in its meaning and 
respond to that disclosure by reflecting upon it. Through this 
reflection is disclosed a truth of our existence. This truth of existence 
is brought forth in light of the meaning of the thing. In other words, 
what the thing is tells a truth about our existence. 
To be free means that we are open and responsive. This 
requires that we not force our directives upon the thing. Approaches 
of utility, systematizing, mastering, etc. are ways by which we force 
our directives upon the thing. By so doing, we miss the meaning of 
the thing and neglect to reflect upon what that meaning discloses. 
Thus, we must bring ourselves into accord with the disclosure. This 
accord is what Heidegger refers to as attunement. Letting beings be, 
freedom, is an attuning. When we let beings be, we engage them 
with a mind-set which brings us into accord with the disclosure. 
Freedom allows us to engage openly and responsively; this is 
a ttunemen t. 
Letting being be, which is an attuning, a bringing into accord, 
prevails throughout and anticipates all the open comportment 
that flourishes in it. Man's comportment is brought into 
definite accord throughout by the openedness of being as a 
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whole. However, from the point of view of everyday 
calculations and preoccupations this "as a whole" appears to be 
incalculable and incomprehensible. (Truth, 131 & 132) 
Hannah Arendt helps to clarify that this type of thinking 
requires the thinker to withdraw from the object of thought. Direct 
perception does not allow one to think of the being perceived, for if 
this is what we are doing during a direct encounter then we are 
really withdrawing from that encounter. 4 Thinking thus entails 
"serenity, release, a state of relaxation , in brief, a disposition that 
'lets be'." In order to attain such a disposition, we must release 
ourselves from any form of willing. 5 
Arendt seems to be suggesting distancing from the object, if not 
physically then conceptually. This idea of distancing is connected to 
that of willing. Willing entails our positing predetermined and/or 
preconditioned ends onto the encounter. This occurs when our 
approach toward things is motivated by a predetermined purpose. If 
we refer back to the example of the coin, approaching the coin as 
payment for a debt forces our directives upon the com. The 
necessary distancing and release from willing are not achieved, so we 
are unable to experience the coin as anything other than an object of 
utility. Whenever we become the focus of our encounter with things , 
we force the thing to subordinate itself to our particular directive. 
The result is our inability to encounter the thing as a whole and our 
unwillingness to reflect upon the disclosure. Heidegger suggests that 
this approach prevails with things which are familiar to us. 
4 Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in Heidegger and Modern 
Philosophy Critical Essays , ed. by Michael Murray, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press , 1978) pp . 299 and 300. 
5 Ibid ., p. 303. 
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Therefore, the less we know of a thing, the more readily we let it be 
the thing that it is. Heidegger explains in the following passage: 
. . . where beings are not very familiar to man and are scarcely 
and only roughly known by science, the openedness of beings 
as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where the 
familiar and well known has become boundless, and nothing 1s 
any longer able to withstand the business of knowing, since 
technical mastery over things bears itself without limit. 
Precisely in the leveling and planning of this omniscience, this 
mere knowing, the openedness of beings gets flattened out into 
the apparent nothingness of what is no longer even a matter of 
indifference but rather is simply forgotten.(Truth, 131) 
Since the coin is a familiar object of utility for us, the question 
arises as to whether or not it is able to disclose truth. In his 
discussion of the Greek temple (Origin, 168), Heidegger indicates that 
it is possible for objects of utility to meet the conditions necessary 
for the disclosure of truth. Certainly, the temple can be viewed for 
its use value which lies in providing shelter for the gods and a place 
in which to worship them. Yet, Heidegger discusses the temple's 
ability to disclose truth. If there is a distinction between the coin 
and the temple, it may rest m the fact that the temple is no longer a 
familiar object of utility. It seems reasonable to suggest that the 
ancient Greeks did not experience a disclosure of truth when they 
went to temple because they approached with a predetermined 
directive. It is possible that the temple only discloses the Greek 
epoch to us because we do not utilize it and are thereby able to 
freely engage it. Although Heidegger does not directly address this 
issue , the preceding passage indicates that the coin may not be free 
to disclose truth because we ordinarily approach it for its use value. 
We thereby force our directives onto the coin and fail to achieve the 
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necessary distancing. It , therefore , seems to be uncommon for 
familiar objects of utility to disclose truth. 
Truth involves the thing being discovered and the discoverer. 
What is discovered is a truth of existence , a truth of what the thing 
means and of what that meaning reveals about ourselves. Things 
only have meaning in the context of human existence , so Heidegger 
recogmzes that their truth lies in their relatedness to that existence 
and not merely in their use value . The revelation of truth requires 
that we participate in the experience through reception and 
reflection. Our willingness to receive and to respond is as essential to 
the disclosure of truth as is the thing we are encountering. We , 
however, normally do not engage things on this level. Thus , we 
frustrate the event of truth. Our everyday approach toward things IS 
one of examination , utility , or mastery . This is why artworks are 
essential to the revelation of truth. An artwork IS a thing which 
enables us to look onto our existence because works of art enable us 
to transcend our everyday approach toward things. Before 
discussing how readily works of art hold fast to the condition s 
necessary for truth , we need to examme why things other than 
artworks are not successful in disclosing truth. 
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II. THING, EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGY 
Things , equipment , and technology are able to reveal 
observable and functional truth . That IS , we are able to make claims 
about their ob servable propertie s and their usefulness. However , we 
are not able to enter into a co-re sponding relationship with them. 
For Heidegger , something exists with meanmg . The meaning of the 
thing is derived from its relationship to us . So truth encompasses 
more than the properties of a thing; it includes that thing's meanmg 
in the context of historical humankind . Therefore , the truth of a 
thing is a truth about that thing and about ourselves. 
Observing alone cannot render meaning because it focuse s on 
certain aspects of the thing thus excluding the rest of that which 
makes the thing what it IS. Consequently , the thing is not 
experienced as a whole . Moreover , we tend to approach thing s, 
equipment, and technology with an eye on what each can do for us. 
Such an approach does not consider the thing as a whole nor does it 
reflect upon what the thing is as it exists. Instead , our common 
approach toward things , equipment , and technology is one of 
domination. We approach each with an eye on how we can control it 
so that it may serve us . As a result , we miss the meaning that thing s, 
equipment , and technology have in our existence , thereby missmg 
the truth about them and a truth about ourselves. 
"The Origin of the Work of Art" addresses the reasons why 
things and equipment do not reveal truth . Heidegger maintains that 
the three leading interpretations of the thing are an assault upon the 
1 3 
thing.(Origin, 160) The first interpretation considers the thing as the 
bearer of traits (Origin, 155) and thereby keeps the thing too distant 
from us.(Origin, 157) This interpretation focuses only on the external 
properties of the thing , thereby removing the thing from its context , 
its place m human existence. If we employ our previous example of 
the coin to this interpretation , we encounter the coin as metal , round, 
small , and flat. We experience the coin in a purely observational and 
thereby objective sense. 
The second interpretation explains the thing as the unity of 
what is presented to the senses (Origin, 156), which brings the thing 
too close to us. This interpretation results in a preoccupation with 
how the thing affects us in that specific encounter with it; thus , we as 
individuals become the sole standard of the thing's truth . We now 
encounter the coin as hard , smooth , and shiny. We experience the 
coin in a purely sensational and thereby subjective sense. Heidegger 
explains the result of these two interpretations in the following 
passage: 
In both interpretations the thing vanishes. It is therefore 
necessary to avoid the exaggerations of both. The thing itself 
must be allowed to remain in its self-containment. It must be 
accepted in its own constancy. This the third interpretation 
seems to do, .... (Truth, 157) 
The third interpretation views the thing as formed 
matter.(Origin , 157) Although this interpretation accepts things m 
their own constancy, Heidegger cautions that the fact that it has been 
taken as self-evident in modern investigation means that "it is an 
encroachment upon the thing-being of the thing . "(Origin, 160) This 
last interpretation results in a preconditioning of the expectations of 
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the encounter with the thing, thereby limiting our receptivity to it. 
By this interpretation we encounter the coin as a means of 
commerce. We experience the coin purely through its use value and 
thereby in a utilitarian sense. 
Heidegger's rejection of the leading interpretations of the thing 
centers around their inability to receive the thing as the thing that it 
1s. So , when Heidegger tells us that the three interpretations of the 
thing and combinations thereof "preconceive all immediate 
experience" and thereby "shackle reflection" (Origin , 160), he means 
that these interpretations inhibit us from entering into the openness 
of the open region; thus, the freedom and attunement necessary for 
the disclosure of truth is not achieved . Being present in the openness 
requires that we listen to what the thing has to reveal and reflect 
upon what we have heard. The product of the thing's presentation 
and our reflection is truth. Thus , attaining truth from the thing 
reqmres our engagmg with its physical properties and the meaning 
of its existence. 
The problem 1s that we readily approach things with a 
predetermined objective, thereby failing to bring ourselves into 
accord with all that they are as they exist. We are even more 
inclined to impose our directives onto equipment. This is because 
equipment is brought into existence only to meet our specific needs . 
Therefore, our approach toward equipment is one of utility; we 
encounter equipment when we need to use it. As a result, we fail to 
encounter what the equipment means m its usefulness. 
Heidegger explains that equipment consists in controlling form 
and matter according to the purpose of the thing.(Origin, 157) The 
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matter and form will vary depending on the equipment's intended 
use. The equipmental quality of all equipment consists in its 
usefulness.(Origin , 162) The essential Being of equipment lies m its 
reliability.(Origin, 163) The question is, how is truth attained 
through the piece of equipment? The problem of distancing which 
resulted from the first two interpretations of the thing also applies 
to equipment. Equipment can be approached by way of observation 
or by way of use. In the former, description, explanation, and report 
set us too far from the equipment to enter into the disclosure of 
truth. (Origin, 164) Conversely, in utility the matter of the 
equipment disappears into usefulness and serviceability .(Origin, 171) 
The problem with merely describing, explaining, and reporting 
on the equipment is the same problem as the first interpretation of 
things. As we recall, that interpretation focused on the thing as the 
bearer of traits which resulted in removing the thing from its 
context. Observation alone also focuses on the external aspects of the 
equipment, thereby missing the meaning it has in our lives. The 
freedom which is necessary for the revelation of truth is not 
accomplished because we have already determined the mode of 
approach. For example, if we approached the equipment with the 
intention of reporting on it, our approach would be prestructured 
according to the information needed in the report. Consequently, we 
are not free to engage the equipment nor reflect upon it , and it is 
not free to present itself as the thing that it is. If we had to report 
on an electric wheelchair, for example, we might look for the type of 
metal used to construct it, the battery voltage necessary to operate it, 
its maximum speed, weight capacity, etc.. However, this information 
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will not lead us to discover the meanmg that the wheelchair has, but 
this meaning is as much a part of the wheelchair as are its external 
components. 
Approaching equipment for utility results in a problem which 
IS similar to that of the third interpretation which views the thing as 
formed matter. As with this interpretation, utility focuses on our 
predetermined purpose for the encounter. Using the wheelchair fails 
to lead us to its truth because in our using the chair we forget its 
composition. That IS, we are focused on how well it accomplishes its 
purpose of moving us from place to place. In addition to limiting the 
freedom necessary for the openness of the open region, both 
observation and utilization of the equipment neglect to reflect upon 
it. If the truth of the wheelchair rests in its being the thing that it is 
as it exists then its truth is not just compositional or functional; it is 
also meaningful. The wheelchair means freedom of movement and a 
sense of independence for the person who needs it, and this meaning 
is accomplished through its structure and function. As observer and 
user we are imposing and nonreflective; therefore, we miss the 
whole of what the wheelchair is as it exists. 
The two approaches toward equipment, observation and utility, 
produce the same obstacle to truth as do the three interpretations of 
thing as the bearer of traits, the unity of what is presented to the 
senses, and formed matter. The obstacle rests in our imposing 
directives upon the encounter instead of allowing the encounter to 
direct us. Of course, equipment lends itself to subjective ends more 
readily than do mere things. This preoccupation with 
predetermining, preconditioning, and prescribing inhibits the 
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freedom which is essential to the disclosure of truth. Such a danger 
peaks in the area of science and technology, where ordinary 
preoccupations are easily heightened to a preoccupation with 
mastering. 
Harold Alderman points out that Heidegger's problem with 
science and technology is that they are not Being-oriented. Our 
mistake is that we take control, thereby bringing Being before 
ourselves and relating it and beings to ourselves. 6 Scientific 
projection determines the manner in which facts must conform to the 
scientific investigation . Such projection serves to determine a sphere 
of Being and force it into a definite realm of Being.7 Since 
experiments are restricted to humanly imposed directives , modern 
science has come to depend on our confirmation of the hypothesis , 
for we ourselves determine the conception of fact, the experiment, 
and the conformation. The institutionalization of scientific 
procedures explicitly grants the power and authority officially to 
manage and objectify Being as an object of research. 8 In the final 
analysis we see that the objectivity of Being in science implies the 
subjectivity of human beings. 9 
It is important to note that scientific thought is not being 
attacked as such. Rather, it is our fidelity to it as disclosing the truth 
that is dangerous. The measurable and explicable nature of beings is 
but a part of their entirety. The scientific approach and its findings 
6 Harold Alderman, "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology," in 
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed . by Michael Murray (New 
York: Yale University Press, 1978) p. 37 . 
7 Ibid., p. 38. 
8 Ibid., p. 40. 
9 Ibid., p. 41. 
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are valid only in so far as they are recognized as revealing a limited 
aspect of the whole. When this is not the case, the freedom 
necessary for the disclosure of truth is not accomplished and "only it 
accomplishes for humanity that distinctive relatedness to being as a 
whole. "(Truth, 129) 
The scientist is blinded by his/her ability to fit the object of 
his/her investigation neatly into an equation that is within his/her 
control (i .e., posited by him/her , calculated by him/her , and resolved 
by him/her). Consequently , the scientist empowers him/herself with 
the determination of Being. This 1s a problem because "truth 1s 
disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially 
unfolds."(Truth , p. 129) The scientist , as scientist, is not in 
attunement with the disclosure of truth; he/she is not open and 
responsive so that he/she might bring him/herself into accord with 
the disclosure. Such human insistence sets the ground for 
errancy.(Truth, p. 135) 
The scientific method's limitations on truth are slightly 
different from those of the thing and of equipment. The reason for 
the difference is that the scientific method explicitly concentrates on 
a given aspect of the scientific object. The problem is that science 
accepts its truths as the truth of the totality of the scientific object. 
The scientific method necessitates a preconditioned approach toward 
the object under investigation, and the directives of the approach 
have been predetermined by the scientist , thus violating the 
conditions necessary for a proper encounter. The freedom necessary 
for the object to present itself as the thing that it is cannot be 
established . 
1 9 
Likewise, the scientist 1s not free to be directed by the object. 
The scientist is not in attunement with the disclosure of truth 
because he/she is not of an open or reflective state of mind. Rather, 
the scientist projects conditions and limitations onto the scientific 
project, thereby restricting its ability to reveal its totality and 
disabling the scientist's ability to encounter the object in its totality. 
Since the scientist isolates aspects of the scientific object, establishes 
him/herself as the standard of measure, and preconditions the 
encounter, the scientific approach is exemplary of the inadequacies 
of the three leading interpretations of the thing. Heidegger talks 
about this type of approach toward things in the following passage: 
... humanity replenishes its "world" on the basis of the latest 
needs and aims, and fills out that world by means of proposing 
and planning. From these man then takes his standards, 
forgetting being as a whole. .. . He is all the more mistaken the 
more exclusively ha takes himself, as subject, to be the 
standard for all beings.(Truth, 134 & 135) 
Edward Ballard attempts to clarify the problem with science by 
detailing the scientific method. He explains that the scientific 
approach reqmres a "working over" of the object. Through this 
working over the object is transformed by being removed from the 
world in which it exists and by undergoing imposed sensitization.1 o 
The transformation enables the scientist to employ a mathematically 
objective method, thus unveiling objective nature. Ultimately, the 
object is reduced to the directives willed by the scientist. 11 The 
evaluation of the object is incomplete because there is no 
IO Edward Ballard, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural 
Science," in Heidegger And The Path Of Thinking, ed . by John Sallis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970) p. 42. 
11 Ibid. , p. 43 . 
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consideration of the object as it exists as worked over. Thus, the 
scientific process falls out of perspective in that it is not recognized 
as a specified process but as a process which is capable of rendering 
evaluation of the totality.12 
The problem is not just that we do not consider the object as 
"worked over" by the scientific approach. It is also that we never 
consider the object before it is worked over. Thus, we neglect what 
the object means . to our existence. The scientific approach also fails 
to look onto itself. In other words, the scientist does not reflect on 
the object to discover what it means to the scientist or to humanity 
as worked over. The imposing nature of science along with its 
vulnerability to human directives empowers the scientist as the 
master of things. This is problematic in regard to the disclosure of 
truth because revelation requires freedom to let the being reveal 
itself and an open region in which the scientist and the object engage 
m relatedness. Both criteria are overshadowed by the mere nature 
of the scientific method. The open region requires that the object be 
free to direct the encounter and the scientist be free to bring 
him/herself into accord with those directives. The scientist must be 
open and responsive in this encounter. Science, however, requires 
that the scientist impose the directives of the encounter and force 
the object into accord with those directives. A logical outgrowth of 
the scientific approach is technology. Our desire to force our 
directives onto things is never more tempted than in the area of 
technology. 
12 Ibid., pp. 44 and 45. 
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In "The Question Concerning Technology" Heidegger explains 
that the revealing that rules in technology is a challenging of things 
(Technology, 296) , the chief characteristics of which are to regulate 
and to secure. Thus, objects come to be viewed as standing reserve, 
things awaiting further ordering (enframing).(Technology, 298) The 
ordering and regulating of objects is in direct opposition to the object 
g1vmg directives, for the technician forces his directives onto the 
object through his ordering. In technology, we are unable to 
encounter the object as a whole because we come to pursue only that 
which is revealed in ordering and derive all our standards on this 
basis (destining) (Technology, 307), thus driving out every other 
possibility of revealing.(Technology, 309) 
Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth 
of enframing that he does not grasp enframing as a claim, that 
he fails to see himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails 
in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists ..... Where . 
enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-
reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own 
fundamental characteristics appear , namely, this revealing as 
such. Thus the challenging-enframing not only conceals a 
former way of revealing, bringing-forth, but it conceals 
revealing itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e., 
truth, comes to pass. Enframing blocks the shining-forth and 
holding sway of truth.(Technology, 308 & 309) 
Heidegger sees technology as inherently restricting the 
revelation of truth. The problem with technology is similar to that of 
the scientific method because technology also requires that we set 
the directives of the encounter and force the object to meet our 
predetermined objective. Truth, however, requires that we be free 
from willing our directives onto the encounter so that the object is 
free to direct us. The revelation of truth is not merely restricted 
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through technology, but it 1s transformed. The ordering and 
regulating of things is not a truth present in them; it is wholly 
posited onto them by our directives. More specifically , the nature of 
technology requires that we encounter things with a predisposed 
state of mind . This disposition re stricts any possible disclosure of 
truth except for the thing's utilitarian value to us. Consequently , we 
neglect to recognize the controlling nature of technology and are 
unable to enter into the openness of the open reg10n. The nature of 
technology heightens this approach toward things by enticing us to 
strive for greater control over them. 
Harold Alderman attempts to further explain the danger that 
Heidegger sees as inherent in technology. He maintains that 
technology is not responsive and contemplative but domineering and 
challenging. 13 In modern technology we posit ourselves as a being 
over nature instead of a being within nature; there is no mode of 
letting things be .14 Technological thought "provokes man to be the 
being who makes nature yield its resources to him and which places 
man in a position to be the provacateur of nature." Thus , technology 
holds sovereignty over beings and over all modes of uncovering 
beings. 15 
Through technology we have come to focus on the efficient 
cause, thereby viewing cause as that which makes or produces an 
13 Alderman , op . cit. , p. 44 . 
14 Ibid ., p . 48 . Alderman illustrates by contrasting a motorboat with a 
sailboat. A motorboat uses energies to overcome the water. The currents and 
winds are seen as obstacles which must be surmounted . Motorboating attempts 
to dominate the water. In sailboating, however, one utilizes currents and 
winds in order to move across the water. The sailboat depends on the wind and 
current , and this dependency is recognized. Thus , the sailboat is a thing of the 
water.(p . 49) 
15 Ibid ., p. 49 . 
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effect. Consequently, "man as the maker and producer occupies the 
center of causality: cause signifies the instrumentality of man." 
Through technology we have therefore come to view Being as either 
ends or means. Technicians choose ends and develop techniques 
which efficiently achieve their goals. In turn, these ends become 
means to further humanly posited directives. The technological 
doctrine of Being ultimately subordinates Being to the goals and 
purposes of the technician. 16 Thus, he/she positions him/herself as 
the determinant of the nature of Being by viewing beings as nothing 
more than materials waiting to be utilized as he/she wills. The 
danger in technology lies in our attitude towards it. 17 Through 
technology we come to view things exclusively in terms of how we 
can direct them to better serve us . This attitude leads us to believe 
that a thing's use value is all that the thing is. The technological 
object , like the scientific object, is not encountered as a whole 
because it is not allowed to direct the encounter, so its truth is not 
revealed. · 
We seek to control through manipulation and through utility. 
Things, equipment, and technology readily fall into our service and 
thus under our directives. The result is a shadowing of the openness 
of the open region necessary for the disclosure of truth . In this 
shadowing the thing, equipment , or technology is not allowed to 
present itself as it exists but instead is viewed by way of our 
subjective ends. 
16 
17 
Ibid ., p. 45. 
Ibid ., pp . 47 and 48 . 
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Heidegger thinks that our everyday approach toward things , 
equipment , and technology reveals only objective or subjective 
truths by focusing on how the thing appears to us, affects us, or 
serves us. Neither of these, however, is reflective of his 
understanding of truth because they are ways in which we force our 
directives onto the thing thereby inhibiting the thing from directing 
us as to what it is. For example, when we encounter things, 
equipment, or technology in an examinatory way , we are only able to 
discover factual aspects of their being. We are able to observe 
construction, size , material consistency, and a multitude of other 
objectified characteristics. The result is a failure to discover the 
thing as it exists in our lives. 
Similarly , when we encounter things , equipment, or technology 
by way of utility , we are only able to discover the useful aspects of 
each. Truth is then measured by how well the thing, equipment, or 
technology serves us in its functioning . This subjective approach and 
the former objective approach "preconceive all immediate 
experience" (Origin, 160) which keeps us from entering into the 
openness of the open region where things are free to direct us and 
we are free to bring ourselves into accord with their directives . 
Consequently, the disclosure of truth does not occur during our 
encounter with things, equipment, or technology . The difficulty 
involved in experiencing truth is displayed in the following passage: 
. . . where beings are not very familiar to man and are scarcely 
and only roughly known by science , the openedness of beings 
as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where the 
familiar and well-known has become boundless, and nothing 1s 
any longer able to withstand the business of knowing , since 
25 
technical mastery over things bears itself without limit.(Truth , 
131) 
At the close of "The Question Concerning Technology " Heidegger 
suggests that the techne of art is a single manifold revealing which 
yields to the holding sway and the safekeeping of truth. He asks , 
"Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally 
... ?(Technology, 316) "The Origin of the Work of Art " answers thi s 
question. Art is able to accomplish the freedom and attunement 
required for the transcendence which is essential to the revelation of 
truth. The work itself establishes the openness of the open region 
necessary for the disclosure. Finally , art is not only able to disclose 
truth, it preserves it. 
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III. THE WORK OF ART 
Our discussion thus far has lead us to the idea that works of art 
hold a privileged position in the bringing about of the event of truth. 
Unlike things, equipment, and technology, the artwork holds open 
the open region which is necessary for the event of truth. Thus 
emerges the Heideggerian interpretation of a work of art. Artworks 
are those things which bring forth the event of truth. According to 
Heidegger , a work is only a work of art when it sets up a people's 
historical existence, enables us to remove ourselves from our 
commonplace routine and move into the disclosure of truth, and 
finds its essence in poetry. 
Heidegger understands poetry as the founding of truth as 
bestowing, grounding, and beginning.(Origin, 186) Poetry is 
privileged in the arts because it is language which first gives 
presence to beings. Language first brings forth the historical world 
of a people and preserves it and the earth by naming and 
presencing.(Origin, 185 & 186) This is why language is often related 
to the disclosure of truth in the Heideggerian sense. Walter Biemel 
explains that meanings are not assigned to words; rather , words are 
able to manifest meanings. 18 Our previous discussions have 
concluded that meaning , rather than function, is what Heidegger 
understands as truth. For example, when we approached the com m 
terms of utility, we found that only its use value, or function, as a 
l 8 Walter Biemel , "Poetry and Language in Heidegger," in On Heidegger 
and Language, ed. by Joseph Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1972) . p . 70. 
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coin was revealed. Yet, the com 1s more than merely a means of 
commerce. The possibility of our encountering the truth of the coin , 
however, depends upon our encountering the coin m an open reg10n 
where it is free to direct us and we are free to be directed. In our 
prev10us discussion of the coin, we found that we were unable to 
encounter the coin freely when we imposed our directives of utility 
upon it, because this approach brings us too close to the coin. 
A.F. Lingis suggests that language gives birth to poetry and 
technique by opening a region in which the clearing of Being is 
brought to light. 19 There exists a distance between the speaker and 
that about which he/she speaks. The latter undergoes a 
manifestation through the discourse. The discourse is about the 
world. 20 However, Heidegger tells us that although language 
presences the lighting of beings, this goes unnoticed in 
language .(Origin, 186) George Steiner helps to explain that "ordered 
verbal discourse" is unable to overcome metaphysical constraints. 
Art, however, is able to overcome such constraints because it "pierces 
to the core of things". Hence, in works of art truth comes into being 
and achieves realization and self-possession. 21 Heidegger explains 
the need for art and its connection to poetry in the following passage: 
19 
for 
20 
21 
132. 
The essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is 
the founding of truth. .. . Art lets truth originate. Art, founding 
preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of beings in the 
work.(Origin, 186) 
A. F. Lingis, "On the Essence of Technique," in Heidegger and the Quest 
Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p. 134. 
Ibid., p. 136. 
George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (New York: The Viking Press, 1978) p. 
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The shift IS thus made from language to poetry, or more 
specifically the poetic. Heidegger understands the poetic in the 
Greek sense of p01esis. Poiesis refers to occasioning and presencing, a 
bringing-forth. Heidegger explains that "bringing-forth comes to 
pass only insofar as something concealed comes into 
unconcealment. "(Technology, 293) When the speaker's world 
overshadows the world of the object of the disclosure, freedom and 
attunement stray and language becomes susceptible to utilitarian 
ends. Artworks, on the other hand, essentially and necessarily hold 
fast to that which is presenced and are thereby able to entice a 
perspective which draws us into a world other than our own. 
Language is also susceptible to an evolutionary process. The 
development of language often strays from its origin. Hence , 
language and the meaning conveyed by its use cannot be considered 
constant. The artwork , however, is captivating. It captures a 
meanmg and enables it to endure through time. The artist 
receptively captures truth and expresses and guards it in and 
through his/her creative production. 
The fact that an artwork is created IS part of what Heidegger 
calls the workly character of the work.(Origin, 178) This creation 
requires mastery, craftsmanship or techne. Heidegger explains the 
meanmg of techne in the following passage: 
The word techne denotes rather a mode of knowing. To know 
means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means 
to apprehend what is present , as such. For Greek thought the 
essence of knowing consists in aletheia, that is, in the revealing 
of beings. It supports and guides all comportment toward 
beings. . . . to create is to let something emerge as a thing that 
has been brought forth. The work's becoming a work is a way 
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m which truth becomes and happens.(Origin, 180) 
Heidegger concludes that truth has to happen in such a thing as 
something created.(Origin, 180) 
Walter Biemel explains that artists possess a kind of knowledge 
which "looks toward something not yet present in such a way that it 
makes it possible to give form to the work." It is this knowledge 
which distinguishes the artist from the handworker and technician .22 
To bring Biemel's explanation a step further, the artist's possession of 
such knowledge is necessary but so too is the created product. 
Jacques Taminaux offers that Heidegger rejects artworks being 
approached in terms of matter and form because these are concepts 
which are adjusted to utensils. An approach in terms of 
representation is also rejected because "the present-at-hand of 
everyday things operates as a standard. "23 Taminiaux's 
interpretation 1s reminiscent of our discussion of equipment and 
technology. The creative process surrounding equipment and 
technology focuses on producing a thing of servicability or utility, 
neither of which requires the apprehension of what is present. In 
fact, the objective which usually guides the creation of equipment 
and technology is how well the thing produced will meet our needs 
or its utilitarian function. The need for the thing is known but this 
knowledge does not necessitate a knowledge of what its usability or 
utilization means. 
22 Walter Biemel, "Elucidations of Heidegger's Lecture The Origin of Art 
and the Destination of Thinking," in Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed . 
by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) p. 372. 
23 Jacques Taminiaux, "The Origin of The Origin of the Work of Art," in 
Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993) p. 402. 
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According to Henri Birault, Heidegger, in discussing techne, 
substitutes the duality of world and thing for matter and form. The 
issue is one concerning the "operative" character of truth. 24 Birault's 
idea of an operative character of truth is essential to understanding 
Heidegger's idea of techne. The product of techne is a thing which 
reveals truth. Since the disclosure of truth is dependent upon the 
fulfillment of certain conditions, techne produces a thing which 
enables the fulfillment of the conditions necessary for the disclosure 
of truth. Birault's distinctions among matter and form and world and 
thing are important ones. Matter refers to the raw material which is 
already existent. Form refers to structure, shape, or construction, all 
of which are secondary to the essential characteristic of techne, 
which is the revelation of beings or the disclosure of truth. The 
thing , however, is that which is brought into presence by the creating 
process of techne. The produced thing is a thing which discloses 
truth. 
According to Heidegger, creation, m relation to techne, is the 
bringing forth of the strife between earth and world (Origin , 181), 
and this strife is essential to the disclosure of truth.(Origin, 177) 
Earth and world are difficult concepts to establish mainly because 
Heidegger does not understand them in terms of their ordinary 
meanmg. Yet, he neglects to establish explicitly how earth and world 
are to be understood. Since both earth and world are crucial to a 
thing being an artwork, we need to attempt to come to an 
understanding of what each refers to for Heidegger. 
24 Henri Birault, "Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger," in On Heidegger 
and Language, ed . by Joseph Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1973) p. 162. 
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Heidegger describes earth as follows: 
It [physis] illuminates also that on which and in which man 
bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth. What this 
word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of 
matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical 
idea of planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back and 
shelters everything that arises as such. In the things that arise, 
earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent.(Origin, 169) 
Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in 
the world.(Origin, 171) 
R. Raj Singh interprets earth as the compamon to and ground of 
the world. 25 However, Joseph Smith describes earth as being rooted 
in untruth, a concealment, a withholding, 26 a principle opposing 
world. 27 He explains that we are of the earth and not merely on the 
earth. Therefore, earth is not merely a dwelling place; it is dwelling 
itself. 28 Of course, earth is most easily understood as nature and all 
that comes from it. However, none of these descriptions seems to 
reflect completely Heidegger's understanding of earth. 
Heidegger describes earth as that upon which and within which 
we dwell; thus, earth seems to include nature and that which comes 
from it. Yet, Heidegger also says that it is that upon which we 
ground our dwelling in the world. In order for earth to provide a 
ground for dwelling in the world, it must have a constant aspect, for 
grounding requires a degree of stability, but nature is fluctuating. 
That is, change is essential to nature. Consequently, Heidegger must 
25 R. Raj Singh, "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork," in The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 48 no. 3, Summer 1990, p. 220. 
26 Joseph Smith, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian 
Interpretation," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p. 191. 
27 Ibid., p. 187. 
28 Ibid., p. 200. 
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mean more than nature itself when he speaks of earth. He hints at 
the earth's constant aspect when he refers to the earth as the 
"resolute foundation" upon which the world grounds itself.(Origin, 
173) Earth thereby include s that stability through which nature's 
changes and our establishing of a world are made possible. 
Heidegger also describes earth as that which comes forth and 
shelters. It seems that earth has the quality of presencing in the 
sense of bringing forth into existence. Thus , part of what earth is 
includes beings, but it must also include the Being which makes the 
existence of beings possible. The coming forth of Being and beings is 
made possible by and constitutes the earth. The beings that emerge 
shelter in the sense of covering and in the sense of protecting Being. 
Earth provides the possibility for world yet has no meaning without 
world. Earth and world are co-dependent in that world needs the 
grounding of earth and earth need s the acknowledgement of world . 
Heidegger explains in the following passage: 
The earth cannot dispense with the open region of the world if 
it itself is to appear as earth in the liberated surge of its self-
seclusion. The world in turn cannot soar out of the earth's sight 
if , as the governing breadth and path of all essential destiny , it 
is to ground itself on a resolute foundation.(Origin , 173) 
For Heidegger , world provides the context within which things 
find meanmg . A thing's meaning is determined through our 
relationship with it. This relationship is established through world. 
Heidegger describes world as the following: 
World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen . 
World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long 
as the paths of birth and death , blessing and curse keep us 
transported into Being. Wherever those decisions of our 
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history that relate to our essential being are made, are taken 
up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered 
by new inquiry, there the world worlds.(Origin, 170) 
Joseph Smith interprets world as not meaning existential living. 
He claims that it is not our environment or nature, and it is not a 
world of substance or essence. Also, world does not refer to the 
subject region of a particular individual. 29 If we accept what world IS 
not, assuming for now that we do , we must inquire as to what world 
IS. Joseph Kockelmans suggests that world is the existential 
dimension of humankind through which all relationships become 
possible and within which we encounter beings. 30 This explanation 
of world seems to be reflective of Heidegger's understanding. 
The notion that world is a dimension is a helpful means of 
understanding world. Heidegger tells us that we dwell in the world, 
so world must include the scope of our existence. However, it is not 
clear that existence is enough, for Heidegger says that objects do not 
have a world and that world is nonobjective in character. Heidegger 
tells us that the· peasant woman "has a world because she dwells in 
the overtness of beings. "(Origin, 170) Objects, however, do not seem 
to dwell at all; they cannot establish relationships or make decisions. 
Therefore, objects do not have a world but must rely on belonging to 
our world, and how we see them depends on how they are revealed 
in world. Through our decision-making and living, we give things a 
context, a meamng, a world in which they can exist. Thus, world 
refers to the realm of existence in which human choices are made 
possible and establish themselves. World becomes essential for the 
29 
30 
Ibid., p. 185. 
Kockelmans, op. cit., p. 170. 
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disclosure of truth because the disclosure involves establishing a 
relationship between ourselves and other beings. 
Smith suggests that the worlding of the world 1s one of disorder 
and chaos. 31 Although disorder and chaos may result from decision-
making, tension seems more accurately to describe the worlding of 
the world. The tension exists between the stability of earth and the 
evolution of · world and between ourselves and other beings. The 
result is not absolutely or necessarily chaos and disorder. Sing more 
accurately points out that the world worlds in a distinct way during a 
distinct historical era but that our relation with our world is 
historically constant.32 
If world creates or opens the possibility for decision-making 
then that possibility must always exist, and as long as we make 
decisions through that possibility, our world worlds. The worlding of 
the world is distinct in that different peoples at different eras of 
history engage in living differently. So, world has an evolving aspect 
as well as a constant aspect . As peoples have worlds, so too do 
individuals. For, it follows that if the criteria for the worlding of the 
world is the grounding of earth, the possibility for deci~ion-making, 
and the actual decisions of living, individuals as well as groups of 
individuals have distinct worlds. It seems that part of Smith's 
interpretation of what world is not is mistaken, for world can refer to 
the subject region of a particular individual. Heidegger hints at the 
collective and singular possibility of world in his discussions of the 
historical world of the ancient Greeks set up by the Greek temple 
31 
32 
Smith, op . cit., p. 186. 
Sing, op. cit., p. 219 . 
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(Origin, 169 & 170) and the world of the peasant woman set up m 
the Van Gogh painting (Origin, 163). By setting up a world, the 
artwork distances us from our everyday world in which we direct 
things. The work draws us into the world that it sets up , thus freeing 
us to be directed. As the worlding of the world evolves in the 
context of world, so must the worlding of the individual's world 
evolve within the context and against the backdrop of an historical 
people. 
The relationship of earth and world is one of interplay and co-
dependence. Our emergence on the earth instigates the worlding of 
world. World is dependent upon human existence. Earth is a source 
for and grounding of existence and activity, but these are only 
possible once we arrive on the scene. It is at that instant that the 
worlding of a world begins . Although earth exists regardless of our 
presence, it does so without being part of a world , without meanmg. 
By setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work of 
art instigates and accomplishes this strife.(Origin, 173) By so doing, 
the work holds the unconcealedness of beings as a whole.(Origin, 
177) According to Heidegger, strife between earth and world is 
essential to the disclosure of truth.(Origin, 177) In a state of strife 
each struggles to surmount the other. In the strife between earth 
and world each raises the other "into the self-assertion of their 
essential natures. "(Origin, 173) Strife refers to the tension which 
exists between earth and world. Things attempt to emerge as the 
things that they are as we attempt to force our directives onto them. 
In our world, we succeed in directing things, thus, eliminating the 
strife. The work of art is able to bring forth the strife by setting up a 
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world in which we cannot actually force our directives onto things. 
In doing this, the artwork distances us from things yet places them 
m a context. This distancing enables us to enter into an open region 
where things are free to direct us and we are free to bring ourselves 
into accord with those directives . The artwork thereby accomplishes 
the conditions necessary for the disclosure of truth. 
Artworks create a medium (open region) through which truth 
may freely reveal itself. In essence , a work , through its creation, 
presences the truth of beings as they exist. The creative process 
accomplishes the disclosure of truth by establishing an open reg10n 
where the strife between earth and world occurs. The work itself 
stands in openness and lights the strife, thus making it accessible to 
us. Thus , Heidegger maintains that the two essential features of the 
work-being of an artwork are the setting up of a world and the 
setting forth of the earth; they are never separated.(Origin, 172) 
Artistic creation is the bringing forth of the strife between 
earth and world. The work is the being brought forth which 
expressly brings forth the openness of beings.(Origin , 181) Where 
the strife of earth and world happens, lighting and concealing move 
apart thus opening a region for the conflict.(Origin, 180) Heidegger 
explains lighting as the following: 
This open center is therefore not surrounded by beings; rather , 
the lighting center itself encircles all that is, . .. Beings can be as 
beings only if they stand within and stand out within what is 
lighted in this lighting. Only this lighting grants and guarantees 
to us humans passage to those beings that we ourselves are 
not , and access to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to 
this lighting, beings are unconcealed in certain changing 
degrees. And yet a being can be concealed, as well, only within 
the sphere of what is lighted. Each being we encounter and 
37 
which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of 
presencing in that it always withholds itself at the same time m 
a concealedness .(Origin , 175) 
Lighting happens as the double concealment of refusal and 
dissembling. When presence only is known , the concealment 1s one 
of refusal. However, when the being presents itself as other than it 
1s, as semblance, the concealment is in the form of 
dissembling.(Origin , 175 & 176) Unconcealment is the happening of 
truth.(Origin, 176) 
Joseph Kockelmans attempts to clarify Heidegger's thought by 
suggesting that as a process of truth, Being only comes to pass in a 
"there". This coming to pass is not dependent on us but on Being's 
spontaneity in e-mitting itself among beings. The "there" of Being 1s 
the domain in which Being illuminates beings as what they are. 
Being therefore takes the initiative. Since Being itself is not a being, 
it withdraws itself as it reveals beings . Hence, the only way in which 
we can grasp Being itself is for us to understand Being as non-
Being. 33 · In relation to artwork, the work is the there, the place m 
which things can direct us as to what they are. At the same time, we 
lose sight of the work itself being a thing. 
George Steiner adds that the essence of "thereness" and of 
meaning which a work of art reveals is contained within the work. It 
is embodied in the substance of the thing and therefore cannot be 
externalized or extracted from the work. This is the concealing 
nature of a work of art. Simultaneously, the work unconceals by its 
articulate and radiant projection of the manifestation of Being. The 
33 Kockelmans , op . cit. , 175. 
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work conserve s Being and gives it a dwelling and sanctuary- 34 The 
eternal strife within the work is one between hiddenness and 
exhibition . It occurs because of the absence of the actual object and 
its intense presence in the work .3 s 
Heidegger tells us that concealment refers to the not yet 
experienced domain of Being.(Truth , 133) Thus understood, 
Kockelmans' explanation of the nature of concealment is acceptable. 
If Being brings forth the being as it 1s then Being itself must give 
way to that which is brought forth. Although Steiner's explanation of 
unconcealment is sensible and con sistent with the double 
concealment of refusal and dissembling, it is not certain that this 1s 
all that Heidegger means by concealment. When discussing the 
Greek statue of the god , Heidegger claims that the statue become s the 
god.(Origin , 170) This claim does not recognize a distinction between 
the work and the actual being of its subject matter. The statue sets 
up the world of the god and the people who worship him. In so 
doing , the statue embodies the truth of the god. Although the statue 
and the god are not the same being , the · truth of each is the same. 
The statue itself as a thing , a being , has no distinct meaning . As a 
work of art, its meaning as a thing gives way to the truth it 
embodies. Hence , Steiner's explanation of concealment is less 
adequate than Kockelman's. 
An explanation of concealment which should be avoided 
associates earth with concealment. C.D. Keyes offers that, in the 
strife between earth and world , truth expresses itself through the 
34 
35 
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world-earth dialectic. In this dialectic earth's tendency 1s one of 
concealment and world's tendency is one of openness. Through this 
dialectic, the work expresses truth and allows truth to express 
itself.36 
Keyes' idea of the world-earth dialectic is acceptable until it 
associates earth with concealment and world with unconcealment. 
Both earth and world are essential to the strife. It is the tension 
within the strife that instigates each to rise forth. We have 
established that earth and world are co-dependent. If they cannot 
be separated yet truth is able to emerge from their union , it is a 
mistake to understand them in polarized terms of concealment and 
unconcealment. Heidegger cautions that "the world is not simply the 
open region that corresponds to lighting , and the earth is not simply 
the closed region that corresponds to concealment. "(Origin , 177) 
Truth emerges from the strife between earth and world ; 
however , lighting and concealing are also m strife. World can conceal 
earth , as we have seen in our discussion of technology and 
equipment, by overshadowing the earth aspect. Likewise , earth can 
conceal world , as we have seen in our discussion of the thing and 
equipment , by overshadowing the world aspect. Therefore , earth 
and world share in the lighting and concealing and are both essential 
to the event of truth (unconcealment ). By instigating the strife 
between lighting and concealing, the artwork is able to disclose truth 
by disallowing either from overshadowing the other. Yet, the strife 
causes both lighting and concealing to emerge, much in the same way 
as it does with earth and world . The work thereby brings about the 
36 Keye s, op . cit. , pp. 71 and 72. 
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revelation of the essence of a being (Origin, 178), where and how 
world and earth interplay. The unconcealment is "a disclosure of a 
particular being, disclosing what and how it is."(Origin, 164) 
Steiner attempts to explain the world/earth interplay and how 
it discloses truth. He explains that in the artwork the world of beings 
IS envisioned on more absolute and nonpragmatic terms. The 
presentness in things is nonutilitarian but has its own integral, 
"ecstatic" authority. The mode of existentiality fundamental to the 
presentness of things exists in and through a work of art. The work 
of art is disinterested creativity, which is dependent upon matter 
(wood, stone, pigment , etc.). In this sense, the world worlds in and 
through works of art.3 7 
Paul Schumacher and Wayne Owens explain why the disclosure 
IS more accurately described as an event. Schumacher maintains 
that the artwork is more accurately described as an event than as an 
object because something new and significant IS being brought to 
bear on the old and familiar.38 Through the artwork "the individual, 
society, and the aesthetic object are brought together in a way that 
elucidates existence" .39 The artwork expresses beings and 
relationships among beings.40 Owens describes the event as 
presencing, which is linked with emerging and living.41 The event 
concerns "the historical relations between things, thoughts , and 
37 Steiner, op . cit., p. 133. 
38 Paul Schumacher, "Art for Existence's Sake : A Heideggerian Revision ," 
in Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 24 no . 2, Summer 1990, pp . 86 and 87. 
39 Ibid., p. 84. 
4o Ibid ., p. 85. 
41 Wayne Owens , "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," m British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 29 no . 2, Spring 1989, p. 132. 
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acts. "42 The artwork removes us from the ordinary expenence or 
view of things and into an extraordinary experience or view of 
things.43 Heidegger terms the characteristic of the work talked about 
by Steiner , Schumacher, and Owens as displacement. 
The work's ability to "cut all ties to human beings" enables the 
work to transport us out of the realm of the ordinary.(Origin, 183) 
The work cuts all ties to human beings in that it does not fall subject 
to our directives. The work's ability to direct us accomplishes what 
we have been referring to as distancing . The work distances us by 
transporting us out of our ordinary encounter with things in which 
we Impose our directives and into a new encounter in which we are 
directed. Heidegger explains that: 
To submit to this displacement means to transform our 
accustomed ties to world and earth and henceforth to restrain 
all usual doing and prizing , knowing and looking, in order to 
stay within the truth that is happening in the work. Only the 
restraint of this staying lets what is created be the work that it 
is.(Origin, 183) 
The artwork opens this possibility and opens the truth of beings . 
Thus, openness occurs within and without the work, the openness IS 
contained therein and the work is therein contained. 
Owens explains that displacement requires a release of all 
previously established standards of the way things are seen and 
interpreted. A new perspective on things is thereby discovered.44 
Walter Biemel adds that the artwork transposes us into a world or 
opens up a world that is not determined by the absolute dominance 
42 
43 
44 
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of our subjective world.4s And Schumacher suggests that 
displacement is made possible because the work keeps us from doing 
what we usually do thus keeping us within the happening of the 
work.46 
These three interpretations are helpful but need expans10n. 
Heidegger tells us that the work is able to transport us because it 
cuts all ties with human beings. Truth , however , requues co-
respondence between ourselves and the thing, so some relationship 
needs to exi , t. Truth also requires that the thing be allowed to stand 
opposed as object. We have concluded that to let the thing stand 
opposed as object means to view the thing as something independent 
of ourselves, yet related to us. So, a work of art's ability to cut all 
ties with human beings can refer to its ability to repel our 
inclinations of incorporating it into our world . The work itself sets 
up a world, and this is the place to which we are transported. We 
remain part of the encounter but not as the giver of directives; 
instead, we are directed. Through the work we are removed from 
our everyday manner of encountering things and drawn into a new 
experiencing of things. By our transcending our world, the work is 
empowered to disclose its truth because it disables us from forcing 
our directives upon the disclosure, but instead forces us to let it 
guide us into the disclosure. A thing is a work of art because it is 
able to maintain an uninterrupted and steadfast being what it is 
(self-subsistence).(Origin, 182) Therefore, it seems that the ability of 
45 Biemel , "Elucidations of Heidegger 's Lecture the Origin of Art and the 
Destination of Thinking ," op. cit., p . 381 . 
46 Schumacher, op. cit. , p. 85. 
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a work to let beings be the things that they are despite our insistence 
1s inherent in all things which are works of art. 
Heidegger employs Van Gogh's painting of shoes to illustrate 
the happening of truth in an artwork . Heidegger describes the truth 
disclosed by the painting in the following passage: 
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the 
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged 
heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her 
slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform 
furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie 
the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides 
the loneliness of the fieldpath as evening falls. In the shoes 
vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening 
grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation 
of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by 
uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the worldless 
joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before 
the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding 
menace of death.(Origin, 163) 
C.D. Keyes draws a definition of artwork from Heidegger's 
discussion of the Van Gogh painting. The painting , according to 
Keyes, is an artwork because it is "a truthful disclosure that reveals 
what the shoes are in their function"; it reveals the Being of beings. 
The thing character of the painting takes a secondary position to its 
functional character.47 The work character of the painting 
establishes a world which Keyes defines as "the ontological context m 
which a functional-instrument is . 1148 
It seems reasonable to assume that Heidegger would agree 
with this definition. Although the thing character and the work 
character of the painting are essential to its ability to bring forth the 
47 
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event of truth, it is · the event itself, our being transported into a new 
world where we are able to experience things in their relationship 
with us, which enjoys first position. As we discovered in our 
discussion of truth, things have meanings only because they exist 
within the context of a world. The painting establishes the shoes as 
existent and as existing in a context , a world. By setting up a world 
and setting forth the earth, the painting unconceals the truth of the 
peasant shoes . The work distances us from the everyday context of 
the shoes, thus enabling us to let them be what they are, yet, draws 
us into the world to which they belong, a new context, the world of 
the peasant woman. The result is the unconcealment of the truth of 
the shoes as they exist. The painting projects an open region m 
which we are able to transcend our world and enter into the world 
set up in the painting. 
This transcendence frees us from forcing our directives onto 
the shoes because they carry no actual utilitarian value for us. We 
encounter the shoes without focusing on their external properties, 
how they affect us, or how they may be of use to us. The shoes are 
thereby free to direct us and we are free to bring ourselves into 
accord with their directives. Thus disposed, we are able to 
experience the event which occurs in the painting, what the shoes 
mean as they exist in the world of the peasant woman. 
George Steiner explains that it is the actual presentation of the 
shoes by the painting that makes it possible for us to experience the 
innermost reality and meaning of the shoes. The insightful 
knowledge of the shoes granted by the painting is not attainable by 
45 
scientific or logical investigation. 49 Only art lets beings be. "Only in 
and through the painting does the pair of shoes achieve a total , 
autonomous being per se." The painting preserves and guards the 
existential inscape and living presence of the shoes even after they 
are no longer of scientific intere st or practical use. The shoes are 
familiar to us, but through the work of art they are distanced from 
their facticity and drawn into the essential truth of their being .so 
Thus, through the painting we are able to transcend our world 
and in so doing we are able to view the shoes in a fresh light. We no 
longer see them as equipment awaiting our immediate use. The 
painting moves us beyond the use and definition our needs and 
conveniences have imposed and enables us to encounter the shoes as 
independent , self-existent beings. The painting itself is a thing which 
establishes and secures the conditions necessary for the disclosure of 
truth . Through the painting the shoes are able to stand opposed as 
the things that they are. The painting detaches the shoes from 
ourselves . This distancing of the shoes helps to achieve our freedom 
to let them be the thing that they are by removing them from the 
context of our world. Since the painted shoes can be of no practical 
use to us , we cannot approach them as equipment awaiting our 
directives. We are , therefore , unable to force our directives upon 
them. Consequently , we are free to be guided by their directives. 
The meaning of the shoes is secured by the world which is set up in 
the painting. Through their meaning the shoes also disclose a truth 
about the peasant woman as she exists in her world. 
49 
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However, Meyer Schapiro points out that the shoes in the 
painting are not the shoes of a peasant woman but are in fact Van 
Gogh's shoes , the shoes of a town and city man . He further suggests 
that it is impossible to say properly that the painting expresses the 
essence of the peasant woman's shoes and her relation to nature and 
work .s t Therefore , Heidegger's associations are not sustained by the 
painting itself but are grounded in Heidegger's subjective outlook . 
Thus , Heidegger has projected images into the painting .s2 
Schapiro raises a significant point. Assuming he is correct , we 
must ask whether or not the individualized aspect of the shoes in the 
world of the peasant woman can be universalized through 
Heidegger's interpretation. In other words, we are mqmnng as to 
whether or not the same truth of the shoes can emerge from their 
existing in a different world. If we interpret the world set up in the 
painting as a world of a town and city man, we can conclude that the 
pnmary meaning that the shoes holds for him is the same as that 
which they hold in the world of the peasant woman. Heidegger 
explain s the truth disclosed in the painting as follows: 
The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field . Only here are 
they what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the 
less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at 
work , or looks at them at all , or is even aware of them . She 
stands and walks in them. Thi s is how shoes actually serve. It 
is in this process of the use of equipment that we must actually 
encounter the character of equipment.(Origin, 162) 
51 Meyer Schapiro , "The Still Life as a Personal Object - A Note on 
Heidegger and Van Gogh ," in The Reach of Mind , ed. by M.L. Simmel (New 
York: Springer Publishing Company , 1968) p . 205 . 
52 Ibid ., p. 206 . 
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The truth of the shoes rests in their usefulness. Heidegger 
explains that the peasant woman stands and walks in them and that 
is how they serve. The same is true of the town and city man, for 
they mean the same to his existence as they do for that of the 
peasant woman. The city man also stands and walks in his shoes; 
thus , they serve him in the same primary manner as they serve the 
peasant woman. All that Heidegger depicts in his imagery of the 
peasant woman's world is easily adapted to the world of the city 
man; yet, the meaning of the shoes remains the same. If we refer 
back to the conditions necessary for the disclosure of truth , we find 
that reflection is a necessary condition. Heidegger indicates the need 
to reflect upon the painting in the following passage: 
As long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, or simply 
look at the empty, unused shoes as they merely stand there in 
the picture, we shall never discover what the equipmental 
being of the equipment in truth is. From Van Gogh's painting 
we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. . . . And yet -
(Origin , 163) 
Here Heidegger IS acknowledging the need for reflection. Even 
he realizes that the shoes alone are not disclosing truth. The event of 
truth occurs because through the painting the openness of the open 
reg10n IS held open. We are thereby able to achieve attunement with 
the truth of the shoes because we are free to see them as something 
more than a piece of equipment ready for our using. Instead, we are 
able to reflect on what the shoes mean because there is no possibility 
of our using them; and their meaning is universal. Thus, we engage 
the truth of the piece of equipment and through that truth we also 
engage a truth about ourselves, for the shoes only have meaning 
because they are part of our world. 
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R. Raj Sing helps to explain that the painting does not only 
reveal the earth and world of the peasant woman but also the earth 
and world in general. Thus, the distinctive role of the painting "lies 
in revealing the worldhood of the world and the earthine ss of the 
earth , and not merely a specific world and a specific earth. "53 It 
seems that we have to accept this universal aspect of earth and 
world , for there needs to be something common between audience 
and artwork in order for the audience to understand the revelation . 
In relation to Schapiro's charge , this means that the universal aspect 
of the shoes , what they are in relation to world, is the event of truth. 
Thus , we are lead to the same conclusion that the localized 
interpretation of the peasant woman 's world assists in conveying the 
universal aspect. 
The specifics of the localized interpretation do not seem 
essential to the event which occurs in the painting , the truth of a pa1r 
of shoes . The question is whether or not it is necessary for the work 
of art to disclose accurately the world in which the shoes belong , or 
whether it is enough that it discloses the truth of the shoes in their 
relation to us as equipment. Although the answer is uncertain, it 
seems at least possible that the accurate disclosure of a world is not 
essential to all works of art. For example, the Greek temple disclo ses 
the truth of the temple , and through its relationship with the Greeks , 
its meaning for them; it also disclose s their historical epoch. The 
meaning of the temple depends on the world of the Greeks. The 
shoes, however , may maintain the same meaning for different worlds 
that utilize them as equipment. Although the shoes may reveal a 
53 Sing , op. cit. , p. 216. 
49 
truth about an historical world , it is arguable that their truth as 
equipment is the same in different worlds that utilize them. 
Schapiro continues to charge that, even if Heidegger's 
interpretation of the shoes was correct, it is a mistake to suppose 
that the truth revealed in the painting could not be attained from the 
actual shoes.54 He also charges that Heidegger is mistaken when he 
claims that the user of equipment does not reflect on it and therefore 
fails to encounter a truth about the world. Schapiro cites Van Gogh's 
painting of his own shoes as an example.55 Heidegger would agree 
with this example. 
For Heidegger, art reqmres techne. Techne 1s not just bringing 
forth; it is also knowledge. This is the gift of the artist. The world of 
the artist is to listen to the telling of truth and to bring it to stand . 
The artist is able to experience truth without having to be 
transported from his world. Moreover, Heidegger admits that the 
user of the equipment, the peasant woman , does know something 
about the shoes. She knows of their reliability; and she knows of this 
without noticing or reflecting.(Origin, 163) Reflection , however, is 
needed for encountering meaning and all that it reveals. In fact, 
Heidegger says that the peasant woman's shoes are all the more 
genuinely the equipment that they are "the less the peasant woman 
thinks about the shoes while she is working, or looks at them at all, 
or is aware of them."(Origin, 162) Heidegger would disagree with 
regard to the observation of the thing. Mere observation keeps us 
54 Schapiro, op . cit., p. 206. 
55 Ibid., p. 207. Schapiro also offers Knut Hamsun's description of his own 
shoes in his novel Hunger to illustrate that the user does reflect on the thing . 
However, the user in this example is also the artist; therefore, the argument 
which applies to Van Gogh also applies here. 
50 
too distant from the thing or fails to provoke us to transcend our 
world of existence . Art, however , avoids both of these hinderances 
to unconcealment and provokes us to reflect , something which is not 
usually enticed by the mere observation or use of the thing , mostly 
because we force our directives onto the thing during these 
encounters. It is possible for truth to be disclosed in the actual 
encounter of the shoes as long as the conditions necessary for the 
disclosure are met. 
5 1 
CONCLUSION 
For Heidegger, the disclosure of truth depends upon the 
conditions of the encounter. Approaching things as objects 
possessmg certain traits, having particular affects on us, or 
performing specific functions for us inhibits our expenencmg truth . 
Since things find meaning through our relationship with them, we 
must be able to encounter that relationship when we approach 
things. In order to accomplish this, we must be able to look onto that 
relationship. This requires distancing. We must distance ourselves 
from willing our directives onto things. By allowing the thing to 
direct us , we discover the meaning that the thing holds for us. This 
discovery discloses the truth of the thing, and by so doing , it also 
discloses a truth about ourselves. 
Heidegger recognizes that our everyday approach toward 
things refuses to allow things to set the directives because our 
everyday approach is predetermined by our immediate needs. . Truth 
is, therefore, not attainable through our ordinary encounters with 
things. Artworks, however, are things which are able to force 
directives onto us by removing us from our ordinary encounter with 
things. By establishing the conditions necessary for the disclosure of 
truth, we are able to experience truth through works of art. Our 
examination of Heidegger's thought has lead us to the conclusion that 
artworks are the only things that are able to disclose truth. 
For Heidegger , an artwork captures the truth of things and 
makes that truth accessible to us. We see things in a different light 
52 
when we view them through works of art. Art almost allows us to 
expenence things for the first time ; at least , works of art allow us to 
expenence things m a new way. Art gives insight as to how things 
are. We discover the truth of ourselves , how we live and interact m 
relation to the things around us and in relation to each other. A 
work of art provides a window through which we can view our 
existence unhindered by preoccupations with the directives of will. 
Heidegger is reminiscent of the ancient world , a world which listened 
to hear the truth of beings and lived within their dictates. Art 
reminds us that we need to listen. It enables us to step back and 
look toward truth. 
53 
WORKS CITED 
Heidegger, Martin, "The Origin of the Work of Art ," in Martin 
Heidegger Basic Writings , ed. by David Farrell Krell , Harper & 
Row Publishers, New York , 1977, pp. 149-187. 
Heidegger, Martin, "On the Essence of Truth ," in Martin Heidegger 
Basic Writings , ed . by David Farrell Krell , Harper & Row 
Publishers, New York, 1977 , pp. 117-141. 
Heidegger, Martin , "The Question Concerning Technology," in Martin 
Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell Krell , Harper & 
Row Publishers, New York , 1977 , pp . 287-317. 
Arendt, Hannah , "Martin Heidegger at Eighty ," in Heidegger and 
Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed. by Michael Murray, Yale 
University Press , New Haven , 1978, pp. 293-303. 
Alderman , Harold , "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology ," 
in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Es says, ed . by 
Michael Murray , Yale University Press , 1978 ,pp . 35-50 
Ballard, Edward, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and 
Natural Science ," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking ed. by 
John Sallis , Duquesne University Press , 1970 , pp . 37-65. 
Lingis , A.F., "On the Essence of Technique," in Heidegger and the 
Que st forTruth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings, Quadrangle Books , 
Chicago , 1968, pp. 126-138. 
Steiner , George , Martin Heidegger , The Viking Press , New York, 1978. 
Biemel , Walter , "Elucidations of Heidegger's Lecture the Origin of Art 
and the Destination of Thinking ," in On Heidegger and 
Language, ed . by Joseph Kockelmans , Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston, 1972 , pp . 370-382. 
Taminiaux , Jacques, "The Origin of The Origin of the Work of Art," in 
Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed . by John Sallis , Indiana 
University Press , Bloomington , 1993, pp. 392-404. 
54 
Birault, Henri, "Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger," in On Heidegger 
and Language, ed. by Joseph Kockelmans, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston, 1973, pp. 147-168. 
Singh, R. Raj, "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork," in The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 48 no. 3, Summer 
1990, pp. 215- 222. 
Smith , Joseph, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian 
Interpretation," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by 
Manfred S. Frings, Quadrangle Books, Chicago , 1968, pp. 184-
203. 
Schumacher, Paul, "Art for Existence's Sake: A Heideggerian 
Revision," in Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 24 no. 2, 
Summer 1990, pp. 83-89 . 
Owens, Wayne, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," in British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 29 no. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 128-139. 
Schapiro, Meyer, "The Still Life as a Personal Object - A Note on 
Heidegger and Van Gogh," in The Reach of Mind, ed. by M.L. 
Simmel Springer Publishing Company, 1968, pp . 203-209. 
55 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alderman, Harold, "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology ," 
in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed. by 
Michael Murray, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978, pp. 
3 5-5 0. 
Arendt, Hannah, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in Heidegger and 
Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed. by Michael Murray, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1978, pp. 293-303. 
Ballard, Edward G., "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and 
Natural Science," in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking. ed. by 
John Sallis, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1970, pp. 
3 7-65. 
Biemel, Walter, "Elucidations of Heidegger's Lecture the Origin of Art 
and the Destination of Thinking ," in Reading Heidegger 
Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington , 1993, pp. 370-382. 
Biemel, Walter, "Poetry and Language in Heidegger," in On Heidegger 
and Language, ed . by Joseph Kockelmans, Northwestern 
University Press , Evanston, 1972, pp. 65-105. 
Birault, Henri, "Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger," in On Heidegger 
and Language, ed. by Joseph Kockelmans, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston, 1972, pp. 14 7-168. 
Bloom, S. and Hill, E., "Borrowed Shoes ," in Artforum, vol. 26, April 
1988, pp. 111-117. 
Brogan, Walter, "The Battle between Art and Truth: A 
Reconsideration," in Philosophy Today. vol. 28, Winter 1984, 
pp. 349-357. 
Goldman, Alan H., "Art Historical Value," in British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 33 no . 1, January 1993, pp. 17-28. 
Heidegger, Martin, "On the Essence of Truth," in Martin Heidegger 
Basic Writings, ed. by David Krell, Harper & Row Publishers, 
56 
1977, pp. 117-141. 
Heidegger, Martin , "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Martin 
Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Krell , Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1977 pp. 149-187. 
Heidegger, Martin, "The Question Concerning Technology ," in Martin 
Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Krell, Harper & Row 
Publishers , 1977, pp. 287-317. 
Hoeller, Keith, "Role of the Early Greeks in Heidegger's Turning," m 
Philosophy Today, vol. 28 , Spring 1984 , pp. 44-51 . 
Keyes, C.D., "Truth as Art: An Interpretation of Seit und Zeit (sec. 44) 
and Der Ursprung Des Kunstwerkes," in Heidegger and the Path 
of Thinking, ed. by John Sallis , Duquesne University Press , 
Pittsburgh, 1990, pp . 65-84. 
Kockelmans, Joseph J ., "Thanks-giving: The Completion of Thought," m 
Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings , 
Quadrangle Books , Chicago , 1968 , pp. 163-183. 
Langan , Thomas, "Heidegger: The Problem of the Thing ," in Heidegger 
and the Path of Thinking, ed . by John Sallis , Duquesne 
University Press , Pittsburgh , 1970, pp . 105-115. 
Lingis , A.F. , "On the Essence of Technique ," in Heidegger and the 
Quest for Truth , ed. by Manfred S. Frings , Quadrangle Books , 
Chicago, 1968, pp. 126-138. 
Marx, Werner, "The World in Another Beginning : Poetic Dwelling and 
the Role of the Poet ," in On Heidegger and Language , ed. by 
Joseph Kockelmans , Northwestern University Press , 
Evanston , 1972, pp. 235-259. 
Owens , Wayne D. , "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art ," in British Journal 
of Aesthetic s, vol. 29 no. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 128-139 . 
Platt , Robert , "Aesthetic Crisis and Artwork ," in The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Critici sm, vol. 44 , Summer 1986 , pp . 339-
349. 
Sallis , John, "Towards the Movement of Reversal : Science , Technology , 
57 
and the Language of Homecoming," in Heidegger and the Path 
of Thinking. ed. by John Sallis, Duquesne University Press, 
Pittsburgh, 1970, pp. 138-168. 
Schapiro, Meyer, "The Still Life as a Personal Object - A Note on 
Heidegger and Van Gogh," in The Reach of Mind, ed. by M.L. 
Simmel, Springer Publishing Company, New York, 1968, 
pp. 203-209. 
Schumacher, Paul, "Art for Existence Sake: A Heideggerian Revision," 
in Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 24 no. 2, Summer 1990, 
pp. 83-89. 
Singh, R. Raj, "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork," in The 
Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism, vol. 48 no. 3, Summer 
1990, pp. 215-222. 
Smith, F. Joseph, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian 
Interpretation," in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by 
Manfred S. Frings, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1968, pp . 184-
203. 
Steiner, George, Martin Heidegger, The Viking Press, New York, 1978. 
Taminiaux, Jacques, "The Origin of 'The Origin of the Work of Art'," in 
Reading Heidegger Commemorations, ed. by John Sallis, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 1993, pp. 392-404. 
58 
